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山羊

Author:山羊
日経225オプション専門
NYテロの時も7600円の時もダンシング!
苦しいほど楽しくダンシング!

身体が萎縮したらやられちゃうからね

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スポンサー広告 | --:--:--
3月4日現在のポジション
御疲れ様でしたあ。

13100 13130 12870 12960(-30)
2日続けての13000円割れ、トレンドが発生しそうな感じですねえ。

債先がちょっと買われすぎのような気がしていますので、それほど強いトレンドは出ないかなあと思っていますけど。どうでしょうか。


本日の山羊は

4P100を60円で2枚売りました。
若干ですが、ボラが下がりました。
先物ベースでは下がりましたが、デルタロングなのに568千円の含み益増加です。

さて、今日のポジション


銘柄     3月              4月
170C                  買20枚(@ 6.00)
150C                  売40枚(@96.95)
110P                    売18枚(@151.00)
105P                    売22枚(@ 85.45)
100P                   売 8枚(@ 56.25)
97.5P  買24枚(@0)
95.0P  買 2枚(@0)     
92.5P  買50枚(@0)


4月限ネット現金 8,806千円(取らぬ狸の含み損益3,436千円)


3月実現損益492千円

デケィ      272千円/日
デルタ     2.90枚


1月実現損益+1,168千円
2月実現損益+2,820千円


今日は事業家の方とお食事です。





テーマ:日経225先物・OP - ジャンル:株式・投資・マネー

本日現在のポジション | 15:45:56 | Trackback(0) | Comments(2)
コメント
申し訳ございませんが、
こんな時間に済みませんが、
バーナンキ議長のここ何回かの発言を入手できますか?
報道ではなく直に目を通しておいたほうが良い気がしますので。

いまや高校生以下の語学レベルなので誤訳リスクを恐れていましたが、原文に当らざるを得ないような気がします。
2008-03-05 水 02:29:25 | URL | ぐた [編集]
取敢えず、昨日の講演です
山羊も英語駄目ですので、意味については聞かないでください。
宜しく御願いします。


Bernanke Speaks in Florida on Preventing Foreclosures (Text)
2008-03-04 09:02 (New York)


March 4 -- The following is a reformatted
version of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke's prepared
remarks today in Orlando, Florida, to an Independent Community
Bankers conference. The topic of his speech is ``Reducing
Preventable Mortgage Foreclosures.''

Over the past year and a half, mortgage delinquencies have
increased sharply, especially among riskier loans. This
development has triggered a substantial and broad-based
reassessment of risk in financial markets, and it has
exacerbated the contraction in the housing sector. In my
remarks today, I will discuss the causes of the distress in the
mortgage sector and then turn to the key question of what can be
done in this environment to reduce preventable foreclosures.

Although I am aware, as you are, that community banks originated
few subprime mortgages, community bankers are keenly interested
in these issues; foreclosures not only create personal and
financial distress for individual homeowners but also can
significantly hurt neighborhoods where foreclosures cluster.
Efforts by both government and private-sector entities to reduce
unnecessary foreclosures are helping, but more can, and should,
be done. Community bankers are well positioned to contribute to
these efforts, given the strong relationships you have built
with your customers and your communities.

The Rise in Mortgage Delinquencies and Foreclosures
Mortgage delinquencies began to rise in mid-2005 after several
years at remarkably low levels. The worst payment problems have
been among subprime adjustable-rate mortgages (subprime ARMs);
more than one-fifth of the 3.6 million loans outstanding were
seriously delinquent at the end of 2007.1 Delinquency rates
have also risen for other types of mortgages, reaching 8 percent
for subprime fixed-rate loans and 6 percent on adjustable-rate
loans securitized in alt-A pools. Lenders were on pace to have
initiated roughly 1-1/2 million foreclosure proceedings last
year, up from an average of fewer than 1 million foreclosure
starts in the preceding two years.2 More than one-half of the
foreclosure starts in 2007 were on subprime mortgages.

The recent surge in delinquencies in subprime ARMs is closely
linked to the fact that many of these borrowers have little or
no equity in their homes. For example, data collected under the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act suggest that nearly 40 percent of
higher-priced home-purchase loans in 2006 involved a second
mortgage (or "piggyback") loan. Other data show that more than
40 percent of the subprime loans in the 2006 vintage had
combined loan-to-value ratios in excess of 90 percent, a
considerably higher share than earlier in the decade.3 Often,
in recent mortgage vintages, small down payments were combined
with other risk factors, such as a lack of documentation of
sufficient income to make the required loan payments.

This weak underwriting might not have produced widespread
payment problems had house prices continued to rise at the rapid
pace seen earlier in the decade. Rising prices provided
leveraged borrowers with significant increases in home equity
and, consequently, with greater financial flexibility. Instead,
as you know, house prices are now falling in many parts of the
country. The resulting decline in equity reduces both the
ability and the financial incentive of stressed borrowers to
remain in their homes. Indeed, historically, borrowers with
little or no equity have been substantially more likely than
others to fall behind in their payments. The large number of
outstanding mortgages with negative amortization features may
exacerbate this problem.

Delinquencies and foreclosures likely will continue to rise for
a while longer, for several reasons. First, supply-demand
imbalances in many housing markets suggest that some further
declines in house prices are likely, implying additional
reductions in borrowers' equity. Second, many subprime
borrowers are facing imminent resets of the interest rates on
their mortgages. In 2008, about 1-1/2 million loans,
representing more than 40 percent of the outstanding stock of
subprime ARMs, are scheduled to reset. We estimate that the
interest rate on a typical subprime ARM scheduled to reset in
the current quarter will increase from just above 8 percent to
about 9-1/4 percent, raising the monthly payment by more than 10
percent, to $1,500 on average. Declines in short-term interest
rates and initiatives involving rate freezes will reduce the
impact somewhat, but interest rate resets will nevertheless
impose stress on many households.

In the past, subprime borrowers were often able to avoid resets
by refinancing, but currently that avenue is largely closed.
Borrowers are hampered not only by their lack of equity but also
by the tighter credit conditions in mortgage markets. New
securitizations of nonprime mortgages have virtually halted, and
commercial banks have tightened their standards, especially for
riskier mortgages. Indeed, the available evidence suggests that
private lenders are originating few nonprime loans at any terms.

This situation calls for a vigorous response. Measures to
reduce preventable foreclosures could help not only stressed
borrowers but also their communities and, indeed, the broader
economy. At the level of the individual community, increases in
foreclosed-upon and vacant properties tend to reduce house
prices in the local area, affecting other homeowners and
municipal tax bases. At the national level, the rise in
expected foreclosures could add significantly to the inventory
of vacant unsold homes--already at more than 2 million units at
the end of 2007--putting further pressure on house prices and
housing construction.4

Helping Distressed Borrowers
Policymakers and stakeholders have been working to find
effective responses to the increases in delinquencies and
foreclosures. Steps that have been taken include initiating
programs designed to expand refinancing opportunities and
efforts to facilitate and increase the pace of loan workouts.
Troubled borrowers will always require individual attention, and
the most immediate impacts of foreclosures are on local
communities. Thus, the support of counselors, lenders, and
organizations with local ties is critical.

Of course, care must be taken in designing solutions. Measures
that lead to a sustainable outcome are to be preferred to
temporary palliatives, which may only put off foreclosure and
perhaps increase its ultimate costs. Solutions should also be
prudent and consistent with the safety and soundness of the
lender. Concerns about fairness and the need to minimize moral
hazard add to the complexity of the issue; we want to help
borrowers in trouble, but we do not want borrowers who have
avoided problems through responsible financial management to
feel that they are being unfairly penalized.

Let me turn now to some recent efforts to help distressed
borrowers refinance. The FHASecure plan, which the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) announced late last summer, offers
qualified borrowers who are delinquent because of an interest
rate reset the opportunity to refinance into an FHA-insured
mortgage. Recently, the Congress and Administration temporarily
increased the maximum loan value eligible for FHA insurance,
which should allow more borrowers, particularly those in
communities with higher-priced homes, to qualify for this
program and to be eligible for refinancing into FHA-insured
loans more generally. These efforts represent a step in the
right direction. Not all borrowers are eligible for this
program, of course; in particular, some equity is needed to
qualify. In addition, second-lien holders must settle or be
willing to re-subordinate their claims for an FHA loan, which
has sometimes proved difficult to negotiate. Separately, some
states have created funds to offer refinancing options, but
eligibility criteria tend to be tight and the take-up rates
appear to be low thus far.

In cases where refinancing is not possible, the next-best
solution may often be some type of loss-mitigation arrangement
between the lender and the distressed borrower. Indeed, the
Federal Reserve and other regulators have issued guidance urging
lenders and servicers to pursue such arrangements as an
alternative to foreclosure when feasible and prudent.5 For the
lender or servicer, working out a loan makes economic sense if
the net present value (NPV) of the payments under a loss-
mitigation strategy exceeds the NPV of payments that would be
received in foreclosure.6 Loss mitigation is made more
attractive by the fact that foreclosure costs are often
substantial. Historically, the foreclosure process has usually
taken from a few months up to a year and a half, depending on
state law and whether the borrower files for bankruptcy. The
losses to the lender include the missed mortgage payments during
that period, taxes, legal and administrative fees, real estate
owned (REO) sales commissions, and maintenance expenses.
Additional losses arise from the reduction in value associated
with repossessed properties, particularly if they are unoccupied
for some period.

A recent estimate based on subprime mortgages foreclosed in the
fourth quarter of 2007 indicated that total losses exceeded 50
percent of the principal balance, with legal, sales, and
maintenance expenses alone amounting to more than 10 percent of
principal. With the time period between the last mortgage
payment and REO liquidation lengthening in recent months, this
loss rate will likely grow even larger. Moreover, as the time
to liquidation increases, the uncertainty about the losses
increases as well. The low prices offered for subprime-related
securities in secondary markets support the impression that the
potential for recovery through foreclosure is limited. The
magnitude of, and uncertainty about, expected losses in a
foreclosure suggest considerable scope for negotiating a
mutually beneficial outcome if the borrower wants to stay in the
home.

Unfortunately, even though workouts may often be the best
economic alternative, mortgage securitization and the
constraints faced by servicers may make such workouts less
likely. For example, trusts vary in the type and scope of
modifications that are explicitly permitted, and these
differences raise operational compliance costs and litigation
risks. Thus, servicers may not pursue workout options that are
in the collective interests of investors and borrowers. Some
progress has been made (for example, through clarification of
accounting rules) in reducing the disincentive for servicers to
undertake economically sensible workouts. However, the barriers
to, and disincentives for, workouts by servicers remain serious
problems that need to be part of current discussions about how
to reduce preventable foreclosures.

We now have more information about the recent pace of loss-
mitigation activity than we did just a few months ago, thanks to
surveys of servicers by the Mortgage Bankers Association, the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors, the Hope Now Alliance, and
others. These surveys generally indicate that servicers
substantially increased the number of loan workouts in the
latter part of last year. The Hope Now Alliance estimates that
workouts of subprime mortgages rose from around 250,000 in the
third quarter of 2007 to 300,000 in the fourth quarter, while
workouts of prime mortgages rose from 150,000 to 175,000 over
the same period. The pace of workouts picked up a bit more in
January.

Despite this progress, delinquency and default rates have risen
quickly, and servicers report that they are struggling to keep
up with the increased volumes. Of course, not all delinquent
subprime loans can be successfully worked out; for example,
borrowers who purchased homes as speculative investments may not
be interested in retaining the home, and some borrowers may not
be able to sustain even a reduced stream of payments.
Nevertheless, scope remains to prevent unnecessary foreclosures.

Lenders and servicers historically have relied on repayment
plans as their preferred loss-mitigation technique. Under these
plans, borrowers typically repay the mortgage arrears over a few
months in addition to making their regularly scheduled mortgage
payments. These plans are most appropriate if the borrower has
suffered a potentially reversible setback, such as a job loss or
illness. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that even in the
best-case scenarios, borrowers given repayment plans re-default
at a high rate, especially when the arrears are large.

Loan modifications, which involve any permanent change to the
terms of the mortgage contract, may be preferred when the
borrower cannot cope with the higher payments associated with a
repayment plan. In such cases, the monthly payment is reduced
through a lower interest rate, an extension of the maturity of
the loan, or a write-down of the principal balance. The
proposal by the Hope Now Alliance to freeze interest rates at
the introductory rate for five years is an example of a
modification, in this case applied to a class of eligible
borrowers.

To date, permanent modifications that have occurred have
typically involved a reduction in the interest rate, while
reductions of principal balance have been quite rare. The
preference by servicers for interest rate reductions could
reflect familiarity with that technique, based on past episodes
when most borrowers' problems could be solved that way. But the
current housing difficulties differ from those in the past,
largely because of the pervasiveness of negative equity
positions. With low or negative equity, as I have mentioned, a
stressed borrower has less ability (because there is no home
equity to tap) and less financial incentive to try to remain in
the home. In this environment, principal reductions that
restore some equity for the homeowner may be a relatively more
effective means of avoiding delinquency and foreclosure.

Lenders tell us that they are reluctant to write down principal.
They say that if they were to write down the principal and house
prices were to fall further, they could feel pressured to write
down principal again. Moreover, were house prices instead to
rise subsequently, the lender would not share in the gains. In
an environment of falling house prices, however, whether a
reduction in the interest rate is preferable to a principal
writedown is not immediately clear. Both types of modification
involve a concession of payments, are susceptible to additional
pressures to write down again, and result in the same payments
to the lender if the mortgage pays to maturity. The fact that
most mortgages terminate before maturity either by prepayment or
default may favor an interest rate reduction. However, as I
have noted, when the mortgage is "under water," a reduction in
principal may increase the expected payoff by reducing the risk
of default and foreclosure.

In my view, we could also reduce preventable foreclosures if
investors acting in their own self interests were to permit
servicers to write down the mortgage liabilities of borrowers by
accepting a short payoff in appropriate circumstances. For
example, servicers could accept a principal writedown by an
amount at least sufficient to allow the borrower to refinance
into a new loan from another source. A writedown that is
sufficient to make borrowers eligible for a new loan would
remove the downside risk to investors of additional writedowns
or a re-default. This arrangement might include a feature that
allows the original investors to share in any future
appreciation, as recently suggested, for example, by the Office
of Thrift Supervision. Servicers could also benefit from
greater use of short payoffs, as this approach would simplify
the calculation of expected losses and eliminate the future
costs and risks of retaining the troubled mortgage in the pool.

A potentially important step to facilitate greater use of short
payoffs is the modernization of the FHA, which I have supported.
Going beyond the current proposals for modernization, permitting
the FHA greater latitude to set underwriting standards and risk-
based premiums for mortgage refinancing--in a way that does not
increase the expected cost to the taxpayer--would allow the FHA
to help more troubled borrowers. A concern about such an
approach is that servicers might refinance only their riskiest
borrowers into the FHA program. A combination of careful
underwriting, the use of risk premiums, and other measures (for
example, a provision that would allow the FHA to return a
mortgage that quickly re-defaults to the servicer) could help
mitigate that risk.

There are, no doubt, tax-related, accounting, and legal
obstacles to expanding the use of principal writedowns. For
example, investors in different tranches of mortgage-backed
securities may not benefit equally, securitized trusts may not
be permitted to acquire new equity warrants, and principal
writedowns may require a different accounting treatment than
interest rate reductions. But just as market participants, with
the help of regulators, obtained greater clarity on the use of
interest rate freezes through guidelines issued by the American
Securitization Forum, industry and regulator efforts could also
help clarify how this alternative type of workout might be
effectively applied.

Federal Reserve System Efforts
I would like to comment briefly on Federal Reserve System
efforts to reduce preventable foreclosures and their costs on
borrowers and communities. The Federal Reserve can help by
leveraging three important strengths: our analytical and data
resources; our national presence; and our history of working
closely with lenders, community groups, and other local
stakeholders. A major thrust of our efforts is sharing relevant
and timely data analysis of mortgage delinquencies with
community groups and policymakers to efficiently target
resources to areas most in need. For example, we recently
assisted NeighborWorks America in identifying regions and
neighborhoods that are at risk of higher rates of foreclosure
and could benefit from increased mortgage counseling capacity.
On the basis of this analysis, NeighborWorks recently
distributed $130 million in newly granted funds from Congress to
thirty-two state housing finance agencies, eighty-two community-
based NeighborWorks organizations, and sixteen counseling
intermediaries around the country.

The Federal Reserve System also is supporting efforts to reach
troubled borrowers and to raise awareness in communities about
ways to prevent foreclosures. Since July, the community affairs
groups across the Federal Reserve System have sponsored or
cosponsored more than fifty events related to foreclosures,
reaching more than 4,000 attendees including lenders,
counselors, community development specialists, and policymakers.

We are also concerned about the challenges of neighborhoods that
have seen large increases in foreclosures and vacant properties
and have begun to work with policymakers, lenders (including
community banks) and community groups to address these problems.
In particular, we have undertaken a joint effort with
NeighborWorks America to help communities develop strategies for
neighborhood stabilization.

Conclusion
Reducing the rate of preventable foreclosures would promote
economic stability for households, neighborhoods, and the nation
as a whole. Although lenders and servicers have scaled up their
efforts and adopted a wider variety of loss-mitigation
techniques, more can, and should, be done. The fact that many
troubled borrowers have little or no equity suggests that
greater use of principal writedowns or short payoffs, perhaps
with shared appreciation features, would be in the best interest
of both borrowers and lenders. This approach would be
facilitated by allowing the FHA the flexibility to offer
refinancing products to more borrowers.

Ultimately, though, real relief for the mortgage market requires
stabilization, and then recovery, in the nation's housing
sector. Modernization of the FHA would be of help on this front
as well. I am sure that the FHA and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, given the appropriate powers by the
Congress, will make every effort to expand their operations and
to help improve the functioning of the market for home-purchase
mortgages. For community bankers, FHA modernization and
expansion would provide an important opportunity--of which I
urge you to take advantage--to better serve your customers and
community.

The government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, likewise could do a great deal to address the
current problems in housing and the mortgage market. New
capital-raising by the GSEs, together with congressional action
to strengthen the supervision of these companies, would allow
Fannie and Freddie to expand significantly the number of new
mortgages that they securitize. With few alternative mortgage
channels available today, such action would be highly beneficial
to the economy. I urge the Congress and the GSEs to take the
steps necessary to allow more potential homebuyers access to
mortgage credit at reasonable terms.

Footnotes

1. Based on servicer data from First American LoanPerformance.
Serious delinquencies include loans ninety days or more past due
or in foreclosure. Return to text

2. Historically, more than half of foreclosure starts resulted
in sale of the property. Return to text

3. Based on information about loans in securitized pools from
First American LoanPerformance. Return to text

4. As already noted, foreclosure starts likely increased by
roughly 50 percent to 1-1/2 million last year, and foreclosure
starts are on track to rise further this year. Lender reports
suggest that well over half of these foreclosure starts could
result in property sales. Return to text

5. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2007),
"Working with Mortgage Borrowers," Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation, Supervision and Regulation Letter SR
07-6 (April 17); and "Statement on Loss Mitigation Strategies
for Servicers of Residential Mortgages," Supervision and
Regulation Letter SR 07-16 (September 5). Return to text

6. By comparing these NPVs, servicers can fulfill their
obligation to investors under many pooling and servicing
agreements, which is to maximize the return from all loans in
the trust, including those that are in default or are reasonably
likely to default.
2008-03-05 水 08:48:16 | URL | 山羊 [編集]
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